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In this paper I develop an intertemporal discrete choice model of labor supply. The frame-
work incorporates the nonlinearities in the household budget set and accounts for state de-
pendence in labor supply. Based on panel data for Germany (SOEP), I estimate this model
using a dynamic conditional logit panel data model with random e®ects. The estimation results
show that state dependence is signi¯cantly positive at the extensive margin, yet modest or non
existing on the intensive margin. Using the Markov chain property, I derive short and long
term labor supply elasticities on both the intensive and extensive margin. The labor supply
elasticities di®er signi¯cantly between the short and long run.
Keywords: State Dependence { Labor Supply of Married Women { Panel Data { Unob-
served Heterogeneity.
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Estimating labor supply elasticities on the extensive (labor market participation) and intensive
margin (working hours) using a discrete rather than a continuous speci¯cation has become increas-
ingly popular in the last years. The main advantage of the discrete choice approach compared to a
continuous speci¯cation derives from the possibility to model nonlinearities in the budget function
of a household. Most of the discrete choice literature is based on cross sectional data and focusses
on static labor supply models. Yet, the assumption of static labor supply behavior has been re-
jected by numerous studies that ¯nd strong evidence for state dependence in the labor supply
behavior, an early example is Heckman (1981a). The aim of this paper is to link the discrete
choice labor supply framework with research on intertemporal labor supply behavior. The main
focus of this study is the analysis of true state dependence and of the dynamics of labor supply
behavior of married women on the extensive and the intensive margin.
There exist several studies on the labor supply behavior of women in an intertemporal setting,
e.g. Hyslop (1999). Of particular interest for this paper are those few studies that focus on both the
extensive and the intensive margin of labor supply. Prowse (2005) analyzes transitions of women
between no work, part time and full time work in an intertemporal context. Using a multinomial
probit, she shows that state dependence is present in both full time and part time employment.
In a similar framework as employed in this study, Michaud and Vermeulen (2004) model the
labor supply and retirement decision of households in the US. To the best of my knowledge, for
Germany, this is the ¯rst study of labor supply behavior on the intensive and extensive margin
in an intertemporal discrete choice setting. Previous work e.g. by Croda and Kyriazidou (2005)
focusses on the labor market participation of married women in Germany over time based on data
from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). The authors employ several panel data estimators with
¯xed and random e®ects. Regardless of their speci¯cation, they ¯nd strong state dependence in
the participation decision of married women.
This study extends previous work in several dimensions. First of all the focus is not only on
the extensive but as well on the intensive margin. Although labor supply e®ects on the extensive
margin tend to be more important (Heckman, 1993), it is necessary to study the intensive margin as
well when analyzing the labor supply behavior. This is in particular important for the evaluation of
welfare programs such as the EITC in the US, WFTC in the UK or the Mini-job reform in Germany,
as these reforms provide opposite incentives for the labor market participation and the working
hours (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2005). Further, my analysis is based on a detailed microsimulation
model for Germany (STSM) which maps the relevant regulations of the German tax and bene¯t
system. The striking advantage of microsimulation is that the work incentives of individuals can
be accurately described in the household context. In this respect this analysis goes beyond most
of the previous studies. Furthermore, I model the labor supply of both spouses in a joint utility
model where the partners jointly maximize a household utility function. Thus, labor supply of
the partner is not exogenously given but explicitly modeled within the framework (Killingsworth,
1983). The intertemporal discrete choice approach allows to study the dynamics of labor supply.
1Labor supply elasticities in the short and long term can be derived. This yields important insights
for the evaluation of policy reforms as not only the size of the labor supply e®ects of a given reform
but also about the process of behavioral adjustment can be derived.
Based on data from the SOEP, I estimate an intertemporal discrete choice model for married
women in Germany for the period 1999-2002. In the econometric analysis, I employ a dynamic
conditional logit panel data model with random e®ects where the choice of discrete labor supply
alternatives is estimated conditional on the labor supply of the last period, on individual and
alternative speci¯c variables and on unobserved heterogeneity. It is necessary to control for unob-
served heterogeneity in order to disentangle true and spurious state dependence. The problem of
initial conditions is explicitly taken into account. I follow Wooldridge (2005) and specify a model
for the unobserved individual e®ect conditional on time constant individual covariates and the
initial state. In the empirical analysis I test for true state dependence in labor supply behavior on
the extensive and the intensive margin and derive supply elasticities on both margins. Using the
Markov chain property, I distinguish between the adjustment of labor supply in the short and the
long run.
My empirical ¯ndings are in line with previous studies indicating that true positive state
dependence is signi¯cantly present in the labor supply behavior of married women. I show that
state dependence is high at the extensive margin, yet modest or non existing on the intensive
margin. This result can be found in the dynamics of labor supply elasticities. In the short
run, labor supply elasticities on are negligible. In the long run, however, the in°uence of state
dependence is relaxed and hence the behavioral adjustment markedly increases. Di®erentiated by
groups, my ¯ndings indicate that women with low participation rates, such as women with young
children or women living in the western part of Germany have the highest state dependence.
2 Theoretical Background
Discrete choice models of labor supply are based on the assumption that a household (i) is faced
with a ¯nite number (J) of discrete bundles of leisure and net household income which provide
di®erent levels of utility (Uj) at period t. In this model I assume that households do not save, thus
consumption equals the net disposable income. I follow previous studies, e.g. van Soest (1995)
or Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000) and model the labor supply decision of couples
in a joint framework, by de¯ning a joint utility function with combinations of discrete working
hours of both spouses and the resulting disposable household income.1 In a static discrete labor
supply approach the utility is only conditioned on information of the present period t. To model
1In contrast to previous work on household labor supply, such as the recent work by Michaud and Vermeulen
(2004), I do not consider a collective model where both spouses are involved in a bargaining process to determine
their individual leisure and income. Based on the available information in the data strong assumptions about the
bargaining process had to be imposed (Beblo, Beninger, and Laisney, 2003). Therefore, I stick to the joint utility
model which lacks this °exibility but has been proven to be well identi¯ed and robust, e.g. van Soest (1995), Blundell,
Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000), or Haan and Steiner (2005).
2the dynamics of labor supply, I introduce state dependence of labor supply by conditioning the
utility in period t on the lagged labor market status of both spouses in period t ¡ 1. Note, the
intertemporal framework proposed here does not describe the labor supply behavior over the life
cycle. The agents are assumed to be myopic in the sense that they do only incorporate their
past employment history yet not the future working behavior when maximizing their utility in
the current period. In this respect, the model is similar to the intertemporal framework of labor
market participation with structural state dependence developed by Heckman (1981c).
Uijt = U(lfijt;lmijt;yijt;zit¡1;xit;ci;²ijt): (1)
The utility function of a household (Uijt) contains an observable and an unobservable com-
ponent. The observable component includes the leisure time of both spouses (lfijt , lmijt) and
the net household income (yijt). Further, individual, household and time speci¯c characteristics
of both spouses that are constant over the di®erent labor supply alternatives, such as age or na-
tionality (xit) enter the utility function. These variables can be interpreted as taste shifters of the
preferences. In addition, the utility is dependent on the realized working hours alternative of the
previous period (zit¡1). This variable is constant over the alternatives and in°uences as well the
preferences for leisure and income. The unobservable component consists of a household speci¯c
term ci and of an random error term that varies over time, households and alternatives ²ijt:
In this framework, the decision rule of a household has the following form: the spouses maximize
jointly a household utility given the combination of both partners` leisure time and the household
income and they choose the bundle (j) that provides the highest utility for the household in period
(t):
Prijt = Pr(U(lfijt;lmijt;yijt;zit¡1;xit;ci;²ijt) > (2)
U(lfimt;lmimt;yimt;zit¡1;xit;ci;²imt)); 8m 6= j:
According to the empirical distribution of female and male working hours, 13 discrete bundles
(J = 13) of household income and female and male leisure hours are de¯ned (Table 2). The
maximization problem of the household is subject to a budget constraint as net household income
depends on the working hours of the spouses, i.e the non-leisure time. The discrete choice model
is driven by the probabilities to choose each alternative J. Given these probabilities, the optimal
supply of weekly working hours can be determined as the sum of discrete working hours weighted by
their probabilities. Due to changes in a households` budget function or due to changes of observed
or unobserved characteristics that de¯ne the utility it might become optimal for the household to
adjust labor supply over time. In a static model it is assumed that a household can adjust labor
supply immediately. This assumption, however, is only justi¯ed if state dependence does not exists.
State dependence in labor supply is present if, given the observed and unobserved characteristics,
the working behavior of the last period a®ects the current labor supply decision. This could arise if
the employment history is relevant for prices, preferences and constraints of future periods (Prowse,
32005). Intertemporally nonseparable preferences, human capital accumulation, or signalling and
scarring e®ects explain why the current utility for leisure and income is a®ected by the previous
employment history. Further, ¯xed costs of work such as search or transaction costs are potential
sources of state dependence, as these might di®er by the previous employment state Hyslop (1999)
or Prowse (2005). State dependence can be positive or negative, yet as underlined by the given
examples, the correlation of labor supply over time seems to be positive (Lee and Tae, 2005).
In the empirical application, I will test whether the e®ect of true state dependence is positively
signi¯cant in a model of labor supply. Therefore, I will distinguish between two sources of choice
persistence: true or genuine state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. Next to genuine state
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity, there might be a third source of choice persistence in
the data coming from autocorrelation in the error terms ²ijt. Amongst others, Hyslop (1999)
accounts for serial correlation. Yet, Croda and Kyriazidou (2005) and Michaud and Tatsiramos
(2005) reject the hypothesis of a ¯rst order autoregressive process in a dynamic labor supply model
using German data. Therefore, I assume ²ij1, ..., ²ijT to be uncorrelated over time.
Before discussing the data in more detail in the next section, a look at descriptive statistics of
working transitions provides evidence of persistence in female labor supply, stemming either from
unobserved or observed heterogeneity or true state dependence ( Table 1).
[Table1]
On the diagonal, the persistence of labor supply can be seen. During the time of observation,
1999 ¡ 2002 the German tax and transfer system was a®ected by important reforms, the major
one being the tax reform 2000. As Haan and Steiner (2005) show, this reform had an important
impact on the net disposable income of households. In addition, changes in other variables a®ecting
the preference for work, such as age or children, could lead to transitions in labor supply states.
However, the diagonal shows a high persistence in the labor supply of women.
Note, in this study I do not di®erentiate between voluntary and involuntary unemployment,
thus all women choose their hours points voluntarily without facing labor demand side restrictions.
This addresses a general shortcoming of the labor supply literature. Following Blundell, Ham, and
Meghir (1987), there have been several attempts to introduce involuntary unemployment into a
structural labor supply model (Duncan and MacCrae, 1999) or (Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and
Orsini, 2005). Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and Orsini (2005) derive labor supply elasticities with
and without labor market constraints using the same data as employed in this study, and they
¯nd that elasticities accounting for involuntary unemployment are signi¯cantly lower for singles
and men living in couples, yet not signi¯cantly di®erent for women in couples. This is because the
majority of the inactive married women chooses voluntarily not to work. Thus, the assumption of
a pure choice model for this group is not too restrictive even in a country with high unemployment
rates such as Germany.
43 Data Organization
In order to empirically analyze the above derived intertemporal model of labor supply it is necessary
to employ panel data information of households. This study is based on the SOEP which is
a representative sample of over 12 000 households living in Germany with detailed information
about socio-economic variables on a yearly basis.2 For this analysis, I draw on a balanced panel
for the years 1999 - 2002. I concentrate on married couples where both spouses are aged between
20 and 55 years. Excluded are households where at least one spouse is in full time education, self
employed or retired, because labor supply of these groups di®er from the rest of the population.
After dropping households with missing information 1654 households remain which are ob-
served over four periods. The ¯rst period is required to construct the initial state of labor supply.
Thus, information of three periods enters the estimation proving variation over time and between
the alternatives. Employment alternatives are de¯ned according to the empirical distribution of
working hours in the SOEP data; the working hours in each alternatives are the mean values within
the given alternative (Haan and Steiner, 2005).
[Table2]
The ¯rst three columns in Table 2 yield information about the working alternatives and the
percentage of households choosing these categories. In Germany, part time work for men is very
unusual. Therefore, the choice set for the male spouse is simply, no work, full time and over time.
Women can choose between inactivity, two part time categories, full time and over time. Dropping
two unusual combinations, where the women is working part time and the men is not working, 13
discrete choices of working hours have been de¯ned. As expected, in this sample, the male labor
market participation is far higher than the participation of women. Whereas about 95% of all men
supply positive working hours, only about 75% of the women participate on the labor market.3
Part time work is very important for women. More than 40% of the female population works part
time. Interestingly, that holds not true for the eastern part of Germany which can be seen in the
last column. This, and the higher female participation rate in east Germany point at the still very
di®erent labor market behavior in east and west Germany.
In column (4), the mean disposable net household income in each alternative is tabulated. The
net household income is derived on basis of the microsimulation model STSM (Steiner, Haan, and
Wrohlich, 2005). The simulation model maps the German tax and transfer system in detail. Based
on variables drawn from the SOEP that determine gross income and bene¯ts for all household
members, disposable net income is simulated at the household level. The largest share of gross
income being working income is calculated on basis of the alternative speci¯c working hours and
a constant hourly gross wage.4 The detailed modeling of the net household income is in particular
2For a detailed description of the data set, see Haisken De-New and Frick (2003).
3These participation rates exceed the participation rates of the whole working population as I focus on an age
group with relatively high participation rates.
4For non working individuals hourly wages are estimated on basis of a Heckman selection model. For the speci-
¯cation and the results of the wage estimation, see Steiner, Haan, and Wrohlich (2005).
5important for the estimation of labor supply e®ect as this is the most accurate way to describe the
work incentives (Laroque and Salanie, 2002).
Comparing the net household income over the alternatives, it becomes obvious that due to non
labor market income and due to the tax and bene¯t system in Germany the di®erence between the
income in the categories is relatively moderate. Note, as in Germany, income is jointly taxed with
full income splitting, additional hours of the spouse of a full time working partner do only slightly
a®ect the net disposable household income. This is due to the high marginal tax rates which face
the second earner in a married household (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2004).
Households` preferences for income and leisure might di®er by individual and household spe-
ci¯c characteristics such as age, region or the number of children. As the literature has shown,
in particular the number of young children is important for labor supply of women. In Table 3
the share of households with children of a certain age group by hours categories is listed. These
statistics provide strong evidence that women with young children do not work.
[Table3]




In the following, I will develop the econometric model and discuss the estimation procedure in
detail. As described in equation 1, the utility in period t is conditioned on the lagged depen-
dent variable zit¡1. This leads to the problem of initial condition when estimating the model by
maximum likelihood. This is a general problem of a dynamic speci¯cation which has been widely
discussed in the econometric literature. In numerous empirical applications the initial conditions
problem is tackled by modeling the initial state following the method suggested by Heckman
(1981b). Lee and Tae (2005) and Croda and Kyriazidou (2005) follow a di®erent approach: they
employ a dynamic conditional logit model with ¯xed e®ects, developed by Honore and Kyriazi-
dou (2000). The advantage of this approach is that the unobserved heterogeneity ci is removed
such that no assumptions about the erogeneity of the unobserved individual e®ects have to be
imposed. As in this approach ci drops out the initial conditions problem does not arise. However,
this methods has several drawbacks (Wooldridge, 2005). The main restriction is that ci can only
be removed if the explanatory variables are constant over time. That implies variables such as
net household income, age, number of children or time dummies can not be used as regressors.
Further, the dependent variable is only allowed to be binary, such that the participation decision
but not the decision about the hours of work can be estimated.
6In order to solve the problem of initial conditions, I employ another estimation method that
builds on the approach suggested by Chamberlain (1980) and Wooldridge (2005). This approach
has been applied in similar studies, such as Michaud and Vermeulen (2004), Michaud and Tatsir-
amos (2005) or Lee and Tae (2005). It is based on the assumption that the conditional expectation
of the unobserved individual e®ect ci, h(cjz0;x;±), is correctly speci¯ed, conditional on the initial
state (z0) and on individual speci¯c variables that are constant over time (x). In other words, the
assumption implies that there exists a linear projection of exogenous variables, the initial state (zi0)
and further observed individual variables (xi) and an error term ai that explains the unobserved
individual e®ect. Vector (xi) includes the mean values of the individual and household speci¯c
variables, age, number and age of children and health status, region and nationality. The error
term ai is by de¯nition uncorrelated with (zi0) and (xi). Inserting the model of the unobserved
individual e®ect ci into the above de¯ned utility function, the utility of alternative j becomes:
Uijt = U(lfijt;lmijt;yijt;zit¡1;xit;ci(zi0;xi;ai);²ijt): (3)
Following McFadden (1974), I assume the error terms ²ijt to follow a Gumble distribution.
Then, a dynamic conditional logit model can be derived where the probability of choosing alter-
native j from all J alternatives conditional on the explanatory variables in period t, the chosen
alternative of the previous period and the unobserved individual e®ect has the following form:





The individual unobserved heterogeneity ai is speci¯ed in a parametric way assumed to be
normally distributed, with ai » N(0;¾).5.








The model is estimated by Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) to integrate over the unob-
served heterogeneity. In this approach simulated probabilities are used instead of exact probabil-
ities (Gourieroux and Monfort, 1993) or (Hajivassiliou and Ruud, 1994). In general, independent
random draws from mixing distributions are used in simulation approaches. In this paper, I apply
Halton Sequences as an alternative method, for details see e.g. Train (2003). The superior coverage
compared to random draws and the negative correlation over the observations lead to a signi¯cant
reduction in estimation time. For example Train (2000) and Bhat (2001) ¯nd in their studies that
the results are more precise with 100 Halton draws than with 1000 random draws. In this paper I
use 50 Halton draws per individual.
5Another way to specify the unobserved heterogeneity is to follow Heckman and Singer (1984) and specify ai in a
non parametric way. Yet, this led to convergence problems for more then 2 mass points and, therefore, a parametric
speci¯cation was preferable.
7Note, in the conditional logit framework variables which do not vary over alternatives, are not
identi¯ed. Therefore, variables that are constant over alternatives (xit;xi) as well as the lagged
dependent variables zit¡1 and the initial state zi0 enter the speci¯cation as taste shifters of the
preferences for income and leisure. State dependence is modeled in a °exible way as a vector of
dummy variables where the category of inactivity of both spouses is the base category. The initial
state enters in the same way. Unobserved heterogeneity is included as a random coe±cient of the
income term. For the speci¯cation of the utility function, I assume a quadratic utility function
similar to Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000). Disposable net household income and
the leisure of both spouses, their interaction and their quadratic terms enter the utility function.
Hence, the utility function to be estimated has the following form:
Uijt = ®yyijt + ®y2y2
ijt + ®lflfijt + ®lmlmijt + ®lf2lf2
ijt + ®lm2lm2
ijt (6)
+®ylfylfijt + ®ylmylmijt + ®lmsflmsfijt:
I assume that the marginal utility of income and leisure varies across households by age, number
and age of children, region, health status, nationality, the lagged dependent variable, the initial
state and unobserved characteristics:
®y = ®y0 + ®y1X1it + Ày; (7)
®lf = ®lf0 + ®lf1X2it; (8)
®lm = ®lm0 + ®lm1X3it; (9)
®lmls = ®lmlf0 + ®lmlf1X4it; (10)
where Ày follows a normal distribution. The lagged dependent variable, the initial state and
the mean values are included in vector X4it.
5 Estimation Results
Table 5 contains the estimation results for the dynamic conditional logit panel data model with and
without random e®ects. Model I assumes that no unobserved heterogeneity was present, model II
allows for unobserved characteristics assumed to vary with net household income.
The estimated unobserved heterogeneity in model II is signi¯cant at the 5% level. This, and
the Akaike Information Criterion6 indicate that it is necessary to control for unobserved individual
6The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) rather than a standard likelihood ratio test has to be considered as
under the null hypothesis the latter violates the regularity conditions, and thus its distribution is unknown. AIC
is de¯ned as AIC = lnL ¡ k, where lnL is the log likelihood at the maximum and k the number of estimated
parameters.
8e®ects. Therefore, for the following interpretation, I focus only on this model. However, despite
of the signi¯cant di®erence the coe±cients are very similar in both speci¯cations. This ¯nding is
in line with Michaud and Vermeulen (2004) who argue that the initial state captures most of the
individual unobserved heterogeneity.
Preference for income and leisure vary with observed characteristics, such as number of children,
age or region. As expected, the presence of young children signi¯cantly increases preference for
leisure of women. In line with previous studies, women and men living in East Germany, and non
German spouses prefer to work more. Taste shifters related to age are not always signi¯cant and do
not display clear patterns. Men with a poor health status have a higher preference for leisure while
for women this e®ect is not signi¯cant. The coe±cients of the lagged dependent variables hint at
positive state dependence in the labor supply behavior of women. As mentioned above, the lagged
dependent variable enters as a vector of dummy variable, the base category being the inactivity
of both spouses. The throughout signi¯cantly negative coe±cients imply that employment in the
previous period reduces the taste for leisure in the current period. This holds for both, men and
women. The magnitude of the coe±cient is the higher the more both spouses work.
An interpretation of the coe±cients in a model with multiple interactions is not too informative.
Marginal e®ects, derivatives or elasticities need to be considered in order to understand the impact
of variables. Empirical derivatives with respect to leisure and income show that the theoretical
implications of the utility function are ful¯lled. For all households the concavity of the utility with
respect to income is guaranteed. The derivatives with respect to leisure show that for a small
part of the population an increase in leisure diminishes the utility; this result is line with previous
studies and does not contradict the theoretical implications of the model (Euwals and van Soest,
1999).
5.1 State Dependence on the Extensive and Intensive Margin
In the following, I will test the hypothesis of positive state dependence in female labor supply
and the impact of the dynamics of the labor supply elasticities. I concentrate on female labor
supply behavior only as previous literature has shown that male working behavior is very in°exible
(Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Given the coe±cients of the lagged dependent variable, I describe
the transition process of labor supply by calculating a transition matrix. This matrix provides
information about genuine state dependence. Unobserved and observed characteristics are assumed
to be constant. That implies all di®erences in the labor supply behavior can be attributed to the
previous employment status which is state dependence.
[Table6]
The elements in the transition matrices are the average one-period transition probabilities
summing over all women independent of their observed working behavior in period t ¡ 1.7 The
7This approach is similar to the simulation strategy suggested by Gong, van Soest, and Villagomez (2004).
They derive a transition matrix for di®erent labor market states (formal sector, informal sector, non-employment)
conditional on the lagged labor market state for persons in urban Mexico.
9estimated transition matrix clearly supports the hypothesis of state dependence on the extensive
margin. The probability of choosing inactivity in the current period conditional on not working in
the period before is nearly 30%. For a women who was working in the last period this probability
is signi¯cantly lower. The di®erence increases with the number of working hours. For a full time
working women the probability of inactivity in the next period is 14 percentage points (50%) lower;
for a women working over time the di®erence amounts to more than 22 percentage points. For
a women who was working part time the di®erence in the probability not to work in the current
period relative to the same women who was inactive, is lower, yet still signi¯cant. These ¯ndings
are in line with the results of Prowse (2005); on the extensive margin she ¯nds a higher level of
true state dependence for full time workers than for those in part time work.
In contrast to previous studies on state dependence in the labor supply behavior of women,
the method suggested here allows to analyze state dependence not only on the extensive but as
well on the intensive margin, that is the impact of last period`s employment on the number of
hours worked. Comparing the choice probabilities on the intensive margin conditional on last
period`s employment, the picture is not clear cut. In most cases, the impact of the previous
working behavior is not signi¯cant. This is in particular true when comparing choices conditional
on neighboring employment states, such as full time work vs. over time work in the last period.
The potential sources of state dependence, named above, explain the di®erences in the persis-
tence between the extensive and the intensive margin. Fixed costs of work or other sources why the
previous working history might a®ect preferences of the current labor supply, are more important
on the extensive margin. Yet, with the similarity of the working alternatives the impact of these
sources is decreasing.
As discussed above, the working behavior of women di®ers with respect to several observed
characteristics. In the German context this is mainly due to di®erences between east and west
Germany and to di®erences between household with and without young children. Therefore, it is
of interest not only to analyze the transition behavior and state dependence of the mean married
women but as well di®erentiated by region and family status.
[Table7]
As found in Table 2, the main di®erence between east and west German women is the higher
labor market participation in the East and the di®erent attitude towards part time work. These
di®erences can be mainly explained with the di®erent historical background in both part of Ger-
many and with a better child care system for young children in the eastern part. For both, east and
west German women, state dependence is highly signi¯cant and positive on the extensive margin
though at a di®erent level and of di®erent size. Whereas in East Germany the state dependence
between over time and inactivity amounts to about 0.16 percentage points, for west Germany the
comparable state dependence is close to 0.24. This result supports the ¯nding of Michaud and
Tatsiramos (2005) who show that South European countries with low labor market participation
of women experience a higher state dependence than women in countries with higher participa-
10tion rates, such as France or the UK. Turning to the intensive margin, again the e®ect of state
dependence is either insigni¯cant or ambiguous in both sub samples.
[Table8]
The labor market participation of women with young children is very low in Germany, in
particular for those with children younger than 3 years. One important reason for this is the
low provision of subsidized child care facilities and the therefore high opportunity costs of women
with young children (Wrohlich, 2005). Therefore, the transition behavior of women with and
without young children is very di®erent. Those without or with older children have a relatively
high participation rate and a lower state dependence on the extensive margin as women having
young children. The state dependence is in particular high for women with children younger than
three years. Conditional on overtime employment versus inactivity in the last period the di®erence
is over 30 percentage points.
5.2 The Dynamics of Labor Supply Behavior
To analyze the implication of state dependence on the labor supply behavior of women, I derive
labor supply elasticities over time and analyze the dynamics of these elasticities. This analysis
provides information to what extent state dependence leads to di®erent adjustment mechanism
over time given a change in the net household income. If state dependence is strongly positive, it
needs several periods to adjust labor supply. In contrast, if state dependence is only weakly present
or non existent, changes in the net household income a®ect labor supply immediately or in the
short run. As labor supply elasticities cannot be derived analytically within the employed discrete
choice framework, I simulate the impact of an exogenous change of female gross hourly wage on
her labor supply decision numerically. The elasticities are derived by calculating the simulated
change in the predicted hours of work and in the participation rates induced by a 1% change in
gross hourly wages. These gross wage elasticities are not directly comparable to often reported net
wage elasticities. Gross wage elasticities capture both, the impact of the tax and transfer system
as well as the behavioral adjustment of household. For the prediction of the working hours and
the participation rate, I derive transition matrices under two di®erent scenarios, the status quo
and a simulated scenario that di®ers by a 1% higher hourly wage. Given the transition matrix and
assuming a ¯rst order Markov transition process, I calculate transition matrices for future periods.
The advantage of this method is that stochastic transition matrices conditional on the previous
labor market status can be simply derived not only for period t but as well for future periods t+k.
Technically this is done by taking the polynomial with degree t of the transition matrix, where t
describes the period of interest. Hence, the transitions matrix after period 2 is simply the square of
the transition matrix of the ¯rst period, after period 3 the polynomial of the transition matrix to
the power of three has to be calculated, and so on. The transition probabilities provide information
about the average number of working hours and the average labor market participation rate at
the end of each period. The average number of hours is calculated by taking the expected value of
11the working hours given the transition probabilities and the mean hours in the di®erent working
categories which are listed in Table 2. The participation rate is simply de¯ned as the probability
of working. Given the average number of working hours and the average participation rate in the
status quo and assuming a 1% increase of gross hourly wages, it is straightforward to derive labor
supply elasticities after each period. The labor supply elasticity in terms of hours of work is simply
the relative change in working hours. This is an unconditional elasticity which includes behavioral
changes on the intensive and on the extensive margin. Elasticities derived after the ¯rst period
are de¯ned as the short term elasticities. A Markov process converges in the long run. Formally,
the steady state is reached if t ! 1: Empirically, the steady state is reached if a further period
does not a®ect the transition matrix and the labor supply elasticities converge.
Before, turning to the interpretation of the elasticities, it is necessary do discuss the assumptions
underlining a ¯rst order Markov process. As stressed above, the Markov process allows to predict
transitions for future periods. This is possible as a time constant transition process is assumed. In
other words, it is assumed that individuals adjust their labor supply in each period with a constant
rate. This certainly is a strong assumption, as it is ambiguous how the adjustment process behaves
over time. In order to relax this assumption a higher order Markov process could be considered
which remains for future work.
[Table9]
Table 9 contains the labor supply elasticities for women by region and family status. Next to the
average elasticities, bootstrapped values of the 5th and 95th percentiles are reported to perform
signi¯cance tests. The labor supply elasticities both in terms of participation and in terms of
working hours are increasing over time. According to the bootstrapped con¯dence intervals this
increase is signi¯cant for the whole population and most of the subgroups. In particular the
di®erence between the ¯rst and the second period is important, ranging on the extensive margin
from 20% for women in East Germany to over 45% for women with young children. With respect
to working hours the increase in elasticities varies from 19% for women with children younger than
three to 40% for west German women. After the second period elasticities increase only by less
than 10% and after the third period elasticities remain constant. Thus, after the third period the
long run elasticity is reached. The di®erences between the short and the long run can be related
to state dependence. In the short run, state dependence prevents the women to fully adjust their
labor supply. However, in the long run state dependence is circumvent and thus, the labor supply
can be fully adjusted to the new optimal working behavior.
The size and the dynamics of labor supply elasticities vary by groups. According to previous
¯ndings about the labor supply behavior of German women, women living in west Germany and
women with young children have the highest labor supply response. Women with children younger
than three years have a very high elasticity on the extensive margin, yet with respect to working
hours it is relatively modest. This is due to the high preference of part time work of this group.
Interestingly, the elasticities in the long are very similar to those found in studies based on static
12discrete choice models Haan (2006). This can be see as support for the static speci¯cation. Al-
though the static model is misspeci¯ed in the sense that it does not consider state dependence, it
seems to adequately model the labor supply behavior in the long run.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have developed an intertemporal discrete choice model of labor supply for married
women. This model combines and extends previous studies by including state dependence in a
structural discrete choice labor supply model that allows to study the extensive and the intensive
margin of labor supply. Hence, behavioral changes of women over time with respect to labor
market participation and working hours can be analyzed. The results of the empirical analysis
support the hypothesis of positive state dependence in the choice of labor supply on the extensive
margin. On the intensive margin state dependence is only modest or non existent. This is due
to the fact that the impact of potential sources of state dependence, such as ¯xed cost, decrease
with the similarity on the working behavior between two periods. Within the intertemporal model
labor supply elasticities over time can be derived. Di®erentiated by groups the ¯nding show that
women with low labor market participation, women with young children and women living in west
German, have the highest state dependence. I ¯nd that labor supply elasticities di®er signi¯cantly
between the short and the long run. State dependence prevents to immediately adjust the labor
supply in the short run, yet after the third period the long run elasticity is reached and women
have fully adjusted to their new optimal working behavior.
This study is not only interesting from a methodological point of view but as well for the
evaluation of policy reforms. Employing the dynamic model it is possible to asses the short and
long term labor supply e®ects of a reforms. In addition to the size of the labor supply e®ects this
model can provide information about the process of adjustment of the labor supply behavior.
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16Table 1: Persistence in the employment of women
Inactivity Part-time work 1 Part-time work 2 Full-time work Over-time work All women ( t)
Inactivity 1,019 95 59 64 17 1,254
Part-time work 1 127 460 89 7 5 688
Part-time work 2 79 121 1,209 86 11 1,506
Full-time work 35 11 85 905 130 1,166
Over-time work 6 3 20 125 194 348
All women ( t+1) 1,266 690 1,462 1,187 357 4,962
The following working hours classi¯cations (weekly)for women are used: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40 .
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003
Table 2: Working hour categories
alternative Share Hours Women Hours men Net income East-Germany
% per week per week in Euro %
1 2.25 0 0 1279 40.94
2 1.56 19 0 1719 33.01
3 2.07 40 0 2165 42.34
4 13.72 0 37 2435 13.00
5 8.68 9.5 37 2707 5.75
6 17.62 24 37 3003 15.09
7 14.39 37 37 3313 36.97
8 3.26 45 37 3504 47.22
9 9.43 0 48 2842 16.03
10 5.14 9.5 48 3117 5.00
11 10.88 24 48 3421 19.86
12 7.42 37 48 3704 48.88
13 3.57 45 48 3902 46.61
The following working hours (weekly) classi¯cations are used: men: 0, 0-40,
>40 women: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40 .
Net household income (monthly) is calculated on basis of the microsimulation
model STSM. The net household income is the mean income in the given alter-
native.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003, STSM
Table 3: Children by working hour categories
alternative Hours Women Hours men child 0-3 child 3-6 child 7-16
per week per week % % %
1 0 0 14.09 23.49 54.36
2 19 0 6.80 12.62 57.28
3 40 0 6.57 10.95 43.07
4 0 37 17.07 23.24 63.00
5 9.5 37 5.57 18.12 69.86
6 24 37 2.06 10.12 54.37
7 37 37 0.95 5.67 32.35
8 45 37 1.39 2.78 28.70
9 0 48 20.03 27.24 65.87
10 9.5 48 6.18 16.76 76.76
11 24 48 3.89 12.64 56.94
12 37 48 1.02 4.48 29.94
13 45 48 1.69 4.24 30.51
The following hours classi¯cations are used: men: 0, 0-40, >40 women: 0,
0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40 .
Share of households with at least one child in the given age interval.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003
17Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Year
Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std.
Year 2000 2001 2002
Monthly net household income in Euro 2963 1015 3117 1190 3174 1215
Age of the husband 0.42 0.07 0.43 0.07 0.44 0.07
Age of the wife 0.40 0.07 0.41 0.07 0.42 0.07
Husband is German in % 0.89 0.32 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.30
Wife is German in % 0.89 0.31 0.90 0.30 0.90 0.30
Health status of husband
1 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.12
Health status of wife
1 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10
Couple living in East Germany in % 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Household with child younger 3 years in % 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.23
Household with child between 3 and 6 years in % 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.33 0.08 0.27
Weekly working hours of husband in period t 39.92 10.26 38.69 10.95 37.62 12.13
Weekly working hours of husband in period t-1 39.10 10.49 39.92 10.26 38.69 10.95
Weekly working hours of husband in the initial state
2 39.10 10.49 39.10 10.49 39.10 10.49
Weekly working hours of wife in period t 20.68 15.64 20.34 15.25 20.30 15.10
Weekly working hours of wife in period t-1 20.37 15.37 20.68 15.64 20.34 15.25
Weekly working hours of wife in the initial state
2 20.37 15.37 20.37 15.37 20.37 15.37
Observations 1654 1654 1654
1)Percentage of people who are with 100% disabled.
2)Initial state is the working behavior in the year 1999
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003 and STSM
18Table 5: Estimation Results
Coef. Std. Coef. Std.
Net Income
Age - Man -40.9646 10.7155 -41.5734 11.7466
Age2 - Man 48.5745 12.1216 49.8908 13.3686
Age - Women 24.9634 9.9072 28.0940 10.9238
Age2 - Women -28.8595 11.4380 -32.7168 12.7260
Constant 3.7331 2.2484 3.1325 2.4068
Net Income2 -0.0148 0.0240 -0.0206 0.0274
Leisure Man
Age - Man -0.9992 0.3511 -1.0184 0.3616
Age2 - Man 1.3540 0.4062 1.3971 0.4187
German - Man 0.0202 0.0094 0.0205 0.0096
East German - Man -0.0334 0.0131 -0.0379 0.0135
Health Status - Man 0.0285 0.0137 0.0283 0.0141
Constant 0.7361 0.0781 0.7471 0.0803
Leisure Man2 -0.0038 0.00013 -0.0039 0.0001
Leisure Woman
Age - Women 0.1803 0.2569 0.2385 0.2644
Age2 - Women -0.0647 0.3095 -0.1142 0.3183
German - Women 0.0086 0.0068 0.0093 0.0069
East German - Women -0.0554 0.0099 -0.0612 0.0104
Health Status - Woman -0.0051 0.0139 -0.0056 0.0143
Child 0-3 0.1148 0.0084 0.1177 0.0086
Child 3-6 0.0313 0.0048 0.0326 0.0049
Constant 0.4063 0.0552 0.4074 0.0566
Leisure Woman2 -0.0027 0.0001 -0.0028 0.0001
Net Income*Leisure Man 0.0026 0.0031 0.0062 0.0033
Net Income*Leisure Women 0.0063 0.0018 0.0076 0.0019
Leisure Man*Leisure Woman
Lagged State2 -0.4931 0.1668 -0.4730 0.1720
Lagged State3 -0.8595 0.1888 -0.7857 0.1964
Lagged State4 -0.5701 0.1152 -0.5377 0.1190
Lagged State5 -0.8503 0.1407 -0.7786 0.1469
Lagged State6 -1.9457 0.1580 -1.8669 0.1654
Lagged State7 -2.7936 0.1868 -2.6707 0.1964
Lagged State8 -3.5742 0.2762 -3.4201 0.2889
Lagged State9 -1.0351 0.1390 -0.9348 0.1448
Lagged State10 -1.3502 0.1794 -1.1925 0.1904
Lagged State11 -2.5750 0.1763 -2.3972 0.1895
Lagged State12 -3.8296 0.2217 -3.6466 0.2347
Lagged State13 -4.8808 0.3136 -4.6537 0.3296
Initial State2 -0.0839 0.1742 -0.1219 0.1814
Initial State3 -0.4328 0.2003 -0.5058 0.2114
Initial State4 -0.1659 0.1266 -0.2274 0.1327
Initial State5 -0.4452 0.1545 -0.5427 0.1647
Initial State6 -0.6332 0.1596 -0.7838 0.1738
Initial State7 -1.4145 0.1852 -1.6450 0.2069
Initial State8 -1.7679 0.2901 -2.0366 0.3171
Initial State9 -0.6223 0.1503 -0.7554 0.1621
Initial State10 -1.1128 0.1922 -1.3310 0.2133
Initial State11 -1.3428 0.1808 -1.6282 0.2098
Initial State12 -1.9282 0.2151 -2.2464 0.2467
Initial State13 -2.1075 0.2985 -2.4694 0.3334
Age - Women 0.0053 0.0101 0.0037 0.0107
Child 0-3 0.0880 0.1155 0.1308 0.1243
Child 3-6 -0.2637 0.0952 -0.2726 0.1018
Health Status - Woman 0.3663 0.1970 0.4098 0.2125
German - Women -0.2784 0.1141 -0.2913 0.1244
East - Women 0.8530 0.2182 0.9654 0.2273
Age - Man -0.0100 0.0115 -0.0095 0.0119
Health Status - Man -0.1761 0.2425 -0.1573 0.2575
German - Man -0.1712 0.1395 -0.1875 0.1477





Uy > 0 100% 100%
Ulf > 0 99% 99%
Ulm > 0 95% 95%
Time dummies for the year 2001 and 2002 have been included.
Variables in italic are the individual mean values.
The lagged dependent variable and the initial state enter as dummy
variables of the working hours alternatives. For the de¯nition of the
alternatives, see table 2.
log(¾) is the log. of the standard deviation of the normal distribu-
tion of the random coe±cient Net Income.
Estimation has been performed using Maximum Simulated Likeli-
hood using 50 Halton Draws.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003 and STSM
19Table 6: Transition Matrix of Women: all Women
Inactivity (t) Part-time work 1 (t) Part-time work 2 (t) Full-time work (t) Over-time work (t)
Inactivity (t-1) 0.281 0.323 0.266 0.102 0.028
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.228 0.322 0.278 0.128 0.044
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.186 0.282 0.292 0.164 0.076
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Full-time work (t-1) 0.141 0.234 0.288 0.210 0.127
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Over-time work (t-1) 0.057 0.135 0.267 0.297 0.245
(0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017)
The following hours classi¯cations are used: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40.
Standard errors are given in italic. Standard errors are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999 -2003
Table 7: Transition Matrix of Women: by region
Inactivity (t) Part-time work 1 (t) Part-time work 2 (t) Full-time work (t) Over-time work (t)
West Germany
Inactivity (t-1) 0.310 0.341 0.247 0.082 0.021
0.012 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.002
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.256 0.344 0.263 0.105 0.032
0.010 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.003
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.213 0.306 0.284 0.139 0.058
0.008 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004
Full-time work (t-1) 0.162 0.258 0.289 0.188 0.104
0.008 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006
Over-time work (t-1) 0.069 0.156 0.283 0.280 0.212
0.009 0.014 0.009 0.011 0.020
East Germany
Inactivity (t-1) 0.184 0.258 0.331 0.170 0.057
0.012 0.010 0.007 0.011 0.006
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.129 0.248 0.330 0.208 0.085
0.010 0.011 0.006 0.012 0.009
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.102 0.203 0.316 0.246 0.133
0.009 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.009
Full-time work (t-1) 0.070 0.156 0.283 0.286 0.205
0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.009
Over-time work (t-1) 0.018 0.066 0.208 0.350 0.357
0.003 0.009 0.013 0.005 0.022
The following hours classi¯cations are used: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40 .
Standard errors are given in italic. Standard errors are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999 -2003
20Table 8: Transition Matrix of Women: by family status
Inactivity (t) Part-time work 1 (t) Part-time work 2 (t) Full-time work (t) Over-time work (t)
Household without young children
Inactivity (t-1) 0.241 0.318 0.290 0.117 0.034
0.012 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.004
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.189 0.313 0.302 0.146 0.051
0.010 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.150 0.267 0.311 0.184 0.087
0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
Full-time work (t-1) 0.108 0.215 0.301 0.232 0.143
0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
Over-time work (t-1) 0.033 0.109 0.266 0.320 0.272
0.005 0.010 0.011 0.007 0.018
Household with children younger 3 years
Inactivity (t-1) 0.650 0.287 0.058 0.005 0.001
0.019 0.012 0.007 0.001 0.000
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.598 0.328 0.065 0.007 0.001
0.021 0.012 0.008 0.002 0.000
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.549 0.347 0.088 0.014 0.003
0.022 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.001
Full-time work (t-1) 0.479 0.364 0.121 0.027 0.009
0.024 0.007 0.012 0.005 0.002
Over-time work (t-1) 0.333 0.380 0.196 0.065 0.026
0.030 0.008 0.018 0.012 0.006
Household with children between 3 and 6 years
Inactivity (t-1) 0.428 0.348 0.173 0.041 0.009
0.013 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.001
Part-time work 1 (t-1) 0.372 0.369 0.188 0.055 0.015
0.014 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.002
Part-time work 2 (t-1) 0.321 0.348 0.219 0.082 0.030
0.013 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.003
Full-time work (t-1) 0.259 0.315 0.244 0.122 0.060
0.014 0.008 0.007 0.009 0.007
Over-time work (t-1) 0.140 0.237 0.282 0.207 0.134
0.014 0.016 0.006 0.014 0.016
The following hours classi¯cations are used: 0, 0-24, 25-34, 35-40, >40 .
Standard errors are given in italic. Standard errors are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003
21Table 9: Labor Supply Elasticities by Region and Family Status
Period All Women West Germany East Germany No young child Children 0-3 Children 3-6
Labor Market Participation
1 0.074 0.082 0.051 0.069 0.180 0.087
(0.064 - 0.081) (0.071 - 0.090) (0.042 - 0.058) (0.062 - 0.076) (0.141 - 0.210) (0.075 - 0.099)
2 0.102 0.116 0.062 0.093 0.240 0.127
(0.086 - 0.111) (0.102 - 0.128) (0.050 - 0.071) (0.082 - 0.104) (0.188 - 0.285) (0.110 - 0.141)
3 0.110 0.126 0.065 0.101 0.240 0.134
(0.093 - 0.120) (0.113 - 0.139) (0.052 - 0.076) (0.089 - 0.115) (0.189 - 0.286) (0.117 - 0.146)
4 0.113 0.128 0.066 0.104 0.239 0.135
(0.095 - 0.123) (0.116 - 0.141) (0.053 - 0.078) (0.091 - 0.118) (0.188 - 0.285) (0.118 - 0.146)
5 0.114 0.129 0.067 0.105 0.239 0.135
(0.095 - 0.124) (0.117 - 0.142) (0.054 - 0.079) (0.091 - 0.119) (0.188 - 0.285) (0.118 - 0.146)
6 0.114 0.129 0.067 0.105 0.239 0.135
(0.096 - 0.124) (0.117 - 0.142) (0.054 - 0.079) (0.092 - 0.120) (0.188 - 0.285) (0.118 - 0.146)
7 0.114 0.129 0.067 0.105 0.239 0.135
(0.096 - 0.124) (0.117 - 0.142) (0.054 - 0.079) (0.092 - 0.120) (0.188 - 0.285) (0.118 - 0.146)
8 0.114 0.129 0.067 0.105 0.239 0.135
(0.096 - 0.124) (0.117 - 0.142) (0.054 - 0.079) (0.092 - 0.120) (0.188 - 0.285) (0.118 - 0.146)
9 0.114 0.129 0.067 0.105 0.239 0.135
(0.096 - 0.124) (0.117 - 0.142) (0.054 - 0.079) (0.092 - 0.120) (0.188 - 0.285) (0.118 - 0.146)
10 0.114 0.129 0.067 0.105 0.239 0.135
(0.096 - 0.124) (0.117 - 0.142) (0.054 - 0.079) (0.092 - 0.120) (0.188 - 0.285) (0.118 - 0.146)
Working Hours
1 0.208 0.228 0.160 0.204 0.270 0.236
(0.175- 0.232) (0.194- 0.256) (0.124 - 0.185) (0.178- 0.227) (0.205- 0.326) (0.191- 0.275)
2 0.285 0.318 0.203 0.278 0.323 0.326
(0.239- 0.317) (0.280- 0.352) (0.154 - 0.231) (0.244- 0.307) (0.249- 0.395) (0.271- 0.390)
3 0.310 0.345 0.217 0.302 0.317 0.342
(0.259- 0.343) (0.308- 0.377) (0.164 - 0.245) (0.266- 0.333) (0.248- 0.388) (0.289- 0.410)
4 0.317 0.352 0.222 0.310 0.315 0.343
(0.265- 0.350) (0.317- 0.384) (0.167 - 0.248) (0.273- 0.341) (0.247- 0.386) (0.293- 0.411)
5 0.319 0.354 0.223 0.312 0.315 0.343
(0.267- 0.352) (0.319- 0.385) (0.167 - 0.250) (0.276- 0.344) (0.247- 0.386) (0.293- 0.411)
6 0.319 0.354 0.224 0.313 0.315 0.342
(0.267- 0.352) (0.320- 0.385) (0.168 - 0.250) (0.277- 0.345) (0.247- 0.386) (0.293- 0.410)
7 0.320 0.354 0.224 0.313 0.315 0.342
(0.268- 0.353) (0.320- 0.385) (0.168 - 0.250) (0.277- 0.345) (0.247- 0.386) (0.293- 0.410)
8 0.320 0.354 0.224 0.313 0.315 0.342
(0.268- 0.353) (0.320- 0.385) (0.168 - 0.250) (0.277- 0.345) (0.247- 0.386) (0.293- 0.410)
9 0.320 0.354 0.224 0.313 0.315 0.342
(0.268- 0.353) (0.320- 0.385) (0.168 - 0.250) (0.277- 0.345) (0.247- 0.386) (0.293- 0.410)
10 0.320 0.354 0.224 0.313 0.315 0.342
(0.268- 0.353) (0.320- 0.385) (0.168 - 0.250) (0.277- 0.345) (0.247- 0.386) (0.293- 0.410)
The 5th and 95th percentiles are given in brackets, they are derived using bootstrapping with 100 replications.
Source: SOEP, wave 1999-2003
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